1. Michael Horton, following Cornelius Van Til, believes in the theory of analogical knowledge.
I, on the other hand, following Gordon H. Clark, believe the theory of analogical knowledge to be false.
But I am puzzled.
Why do Van Til, Horton and many other intelligent people believe that the theory of analogical knowledge is true?
The purpose of this blog post is to give an account of a possible reason why these intelligent people believe in a false theory.
The account is a rational reconstruction.
The claim is not that someone actually believes in analogical knowledge based on the rational reconstruction.
The claim is that the rational reconstruction gives a possible and plausible reason why someone would believe in analogical knowledge.
2. The general idea is that the Creator-creation Distinction implies analogical knowledge.
The Creator-creation Distinction is the ontological claim that everything there is can be divide into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive class: the uncreated and the created.
There is only one member in the uncreated class: God in Trinity.
Everything else belongs to the created class.
The Creator-creation Distinction implies that the existence of God is qualitatively different from the existence of his creation.
God the Creator is uncreated and exists eternally and necessarily.
The creation of God is created and exists temporally and contingently.
Analogical knowledge is knowledge of a proposition expresses by a sentence which contains at least one analogical predicate.
A predicate is an analogical predicate if it means something similar, but not the same, to man as it does to God.
Cornelius Van Til in The Text of a Complaint: "Man may possess true knowledge as he thinks God's thoughts after him. But because God is God, the creator, and man is man, the creature, the difference between the divine knowledge and the knowledge possible to man may never be conceived of merely in quantitative terms, as a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind. Otherwise the Creator-creature relationship is broken down at a most crucial point, and there is an assault upon the majesty of God." (1944, 3 column 1)
3. The term "knowledge" can refers to either what one knows or how one knows, or both together.
Thus, "knowledge" can refers to the object of knowledge or the act, process, mode or manner of knowing, or both together.
The Van Tillian theory of analogical knowledge is *not* a claim about how man knows.
The Van Tillian theory of analogical knowledge is not a claim about the act, process, mode or manner of man knowing.
Both Gordon H. Clark and Cornelius Van Til agree that how God knows and how man knows is qualitatively different.
They agree that the act, process, mode or manner of knowing is qualitatively different between God and man.
Gordon H. Clark: "The manner of God's knowing, an eternal intuition, is impossible for man." (1944, 9)
Cornelius Van Til: "Another possible objection to the foregoing exposition of Dr. Clark's views might take the form that he does draw a qualitative distinction between the knowledge of God and the knowledge possible for men since he freely recognizes a fundamental difference between the mode of God's knowledge and that of man's knowledge. God's knowledge is intuitive while man's is discursive (Cf. 18:5f., 18ff.). Man is dependent upon God for his knowledge. We gladly concede this point, and have reckoned with it in what has been said above." (1944, 6 column 2)
4. The Van Tillian theory of analogical knowledge is a claim about what one knows.
The Van Tillian theory of analogical knowledge is a claim about the object of knowledge:
(a) It claims that the object of human knowledge is qualitatively different from the object of God's knowledge.
(b) It denies that the object of human knowledge is a proper subset of the object of God's knowledge.
Cornelius Van Til in The Text of a Complaint: "If we are not to bring the divine knowledge of his thoughts and ways down to human knowledge, or our human knowledge up to his divine knowledge, we dare not maintain that his knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point. Our knowledge of any single proposition must always remain the knowledge of the creature. As true knowledge, that knowledge must be analogical to the knowledge which God possesses, but it can never be identified with the knowledge which the infinite and absolute Creator possesses of the same proposition." (1944, 5 column 3)
According to Van Til, "we dare not maintain that his knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point" (emphasis in original).
5. If Van Til's theory of analogical knowledge is a claim about what one knows, then what does one knows?
What is the object of knowledge?
Let's consider the candidates for object of knowledge.
There are two constraints that must be met by any candidate for object of knowledge:
(a) A person knows with his mind, so an object of knowledge must be mental.
(b) A person knows truth to be true and knows falsehood to be false, so an object of knowledge must be a bearer of truth and falsity.
Let's consider the first constraint:
Firstly, since things in the world (external to oneself) are not mental, if an object of knowledge must be mental, then things in the world cannot be an object of knowledge.
Secondly, if an object of knowledge must be mental, then there are three kinds of mental object that are possible candidates for being object of knowledge: objects of sensation, perception or conception.
Let's consider the second constraint:
Since a sensation in itself is neither true nor false, if an object of knowledge must be a bearer of truth and falsity, then a sensation cannot be an object of knowledge.
Since a perception in itself is also neither true nor false, if an object of knowledge must be a bearer of truth and falsity, then a perception also cannot be an object of knowledge.
The only known bearer of truth or falsity is a proposition and it is an object of conception.
Conclusion: The object of knowledge is truth; all truths are propositional; therefore the object of knowledge is a proposition.
6. If the proper object of knowledge is a proposition, then Van Til's theory of analogical knowledge is not proper.
In criticizing Gordon H. Clark in The Text of a Complaint, Van Til displays considerable skepticism towards proposition as the object of knowledge (1944, 5 column 2):
The fundamental assumption made by Dr. Clark is that truth, whether in the divine mind or in the human mind, is always propositional. Truth, it is said, cannot be conceived of except in terms of propositions (Cf. 2:9ff; 11:2, 14f.; and especially 22:19ff.). It will be observed that Dr. Clark does not claim to derive this judgment from Scripture; it is rather regarded as an axiom of reason (Cf. 36:13-17; 19:19ff.).
It is not necessary or appropriate to consider here all of the implications of this fundamental assumptions. A few observations are however, of immediate importance. This view of truth, it will be noted, conceives of truth as fundamentally quantitative, as consisting of a series of distinct items. Now even if it could be assumed that human knowledge has this propositional character, it would still involve a tremendous assumption to conclude that the divine knowledge must possess the same character. Since our thinking is pervasively conditioned by our creaturehood, we may not safely infer from the character of our knowledge what must be true of the knowledge of the Creator. Even if we could be sure that human knowledge might be resolved into distinct propositions, it would not necessarily follow that the knowledge of God, who penetrates into the depths of his own mind and of all things at a glance, would be subject to the same qualifications. And it may not be overlooked in this connection that Dr. Clark does not claim Scriptural proof for his fundamental assumption as to the character of knowledge.
7. What then does Cornelius Van Til regards as the object of knowledge?
I propose the following theses regarding the object of knowledge in a Van Tillian theory of analogical knowledge:
(a) Propositions are objects of human knowledge.
(b) Propositions are *not* the only objects of human knowledge.
(c) Objects of perceptions are also objects of human knowledge.
(d) Because of the Creator-creation Distinction, human is agnostic of the objects of God's knowledge.
(e) Because of the Creator-creation Distinction, human can infer that the object of human knowledge is analogical to the object of God's knowledge.
There is much to criticize in regarding these theses.
But I will refrain from criticisms for now.
8. Cornelius Van Til is a fertile thinker.
But Cornelius Van Til is an inconsistent thinker.
I will now briefly quote John Frame and Greg Bahnsen to show that they too have difficulty interpreting Van Til's theory of analogical knowledge.
9. John Frame gives contradictory explanations of Van Til's analogical knowledge.
Frame wrote in Van Til: The Theologian ([1976] n.d., 22): “‘Content’ is an exceedingly ambiguous term when applied to thought. The 'content' of my thought may mean (1) my mental images, (2) my beliefs, (3) the things I am thinking of, (4) the epistemological processes by which knowledge is acquired (including the role of sense-experience, intuition, reason, etc.), (5) the meaning of my language, conceived in abstraction from the linguistic forms used to state that meaning, (6) anything at all to which the physical metaphor 'contained in the mind' may conceivably apply. In senses (2) and (3), there seems to be no reason to assert any necessary 'difference in content' between divine and human thought. Surely God and man may have the same beliefs and may think about the same things (emphasis added)."
Frame wrote in Van Til: The Theologian ([1976] n.d., 22): “‘Content’ is an exceedingly ambiguous term when applied to thought. The 'content' of my thought may mean (1) my mental images, (2) my beliefs, (3) the things I am thinking of, (4) the epistemological processes by which knowledge is acquired (including the role of sense-experience, intuition, reason, etc.), (5) the meaning of my language, conceived in abstraction from the linguistic forms used to state that meaning, (6) anything at all to which the physical metaphor 'contained in the mind' may conceivably apply. In senses (2) and (3), there seems to be no reason to assert any necessary 'difference in content' between divine and human thought. Surely God and man may have the same beliefs and may think about the same things (emphasis added)."
Whatever knowledge is, it is at least a true belief.
Also, the only bearer of truth or falsity is a proposition.
Since a belief may be true or false and since the only bearer of truth or falsity is a proposition, the object of belief is a proposition.
Since the object of belief is a proposition, if God and man may have the same beliefs, then God and man must be able to think the same propositions.
God is omniscient, which means God knows all truths.
God is essentially omniscient, which means God could not have been God and lack omniscient.
Since God exists eternally and essentially knows all truths, truths or propositions exist eternally and necessarily as the objects of God's knowledge.
As such, propositions are not created.
In having the same beliefs as God, human thinks propositions that are eternal and uncreated.
In Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Frame gave a contradictory explanation: "Van Til sums up these emphases in the term analogy. Human knowledge is 'analogous' to God's, which means that it is (1) created and therefore different from God's own knowledge, and (2) subject to God's control and authority". (1995, 89)
Since knowledge is at least true belief, if human knowledge is different from God's own knowledge, then human belief must be different from God's belief.
This contradicts Frame's earlier claim that "God and man may have the same beliefs".
Human belief is either the same as God's belief or different from God's belief, but cannot be both.
Human knowledge is either the same as God’s own knowledge or different from God’s own knowledge, but cannot be both.
Human knowledge is either created or uncreated, but cannot be both.
10. Greg Bahnsen in Van Til's Apologetic: Reading and Analysis claims that a human can think the same things as God thinks: "In knowing anything, according to Van Til, man thinks what God Himself thinks: there is continuity between God's knowledge and man's knowledge, and thus a theoretical basis for the certainty of human knowledge. At the same time, of course, when man knows something, it is man doing the thinking and not God - which introduces a discontinuity between the two acts of knowing, a discontinuity that is greater and more profound than the discontinuity between one person's act of knowing something and another person's act of knowing it." (1998, 226)
Bahnsen does a bit of creative re-interpretation and shift the meaning of Van Til's analogical knowledge from the object of knowledge to the acts of knowing.
I heartily agree with Bahnsen that in knowing anything, man thinks what God himself thinks.
But Bahnsen must be confused.
For this is Gordon H. Clark's position, not Cornelius Van Til's!
For Van Til, human knowledge and divine knowledge do not "coincide at any single point".
For Van Til, human knowledge "can never be identified with the knowledge which the infinite and absolute Creator possesses of the same proposition".
I do not believe Bahnsen's interpretation is faithful to Van Til's writings.
11. Cornelius Van Til has never properly explained how the Creator-creation Distinction implies analogical knowledge.
Since I do not belief the Creation-creation Distinction implies analogical knowledge, I do not belief there can be any such explanation.
Knowledge is knowledge of truth.
Since God knows all truths, if we do not know some of the truths God knows, then we do not know any truths.
Although there cannot be a proper explanation of how the Creator-creation Distinction implies analogical knowledge, there nevertheless are two fallacious attempts at doing so:
(a) The conceptual approach at explanation is based on the idea that our propositions are finite replicas or copies of God's propositions.
(b) The perceptual approach at explanation is based on the idea that all objects of knowledge are objects of perceptions.
John Frame has attempted to flesh out the conceptual approach at explanation in (1995, 89-95).
Since this blog post is too long already, I will criticize Frame's attempted explanation of how the Creator-creation implies analogical knowledge in a future post.
I will now sketch the perceptual approach at explaining analogical knowledge.
12. The starting point for any rational reconstruction of Van Til’s theory of analogical knowledge is the Creator-creation Distinction.
The Creator-creation Distinction is the ontological claim that everything there is can be divide into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive class: the uncreated and the created.
The Creator-creation Distinction is based on the doctrines of God and creation.
Within Reformed theology, the Creator-creation Distinction is not problematic.
13. Cornelius Van Til then extends the Creator-creation Distinction from ontology to epistemology.
The question is why extend the Creator-creation Distinction from ontology to epistemology?
In itself, the Creator-creation Distinction is an ontological claim.
In itself, the Creator-creation Distinction does not imply analogical knowledge.
What additional considerations motivate Van Til to extend the Creator-creation Distinction from ontology to epistemology?
14. A plausible explanation is that Van Til believes in the empirical intuition and takes objects of perception as objects of knowledge.
The empirical intuition claims that all objects of knowledge are objects of perception.
As Michael Horton has written: "Epistemology follows ontology. In other words, our theory of how we know anything depends on what we think there is to be known." (2011, 47)
The Creator-creation Distinction divides everything ontologically into two classes: uncreated and created.
There is only one object belonging to the uncreated class of being: God in Trinity.
Everything else belongs to the class of created creation.
However, human beings cannot have perceptions of God.
But human beings can have perceptions of some created things.
Thus:
(a) All objects of human knowledge are objects of perception.
(b) Human beings cannot perceive God but can perceive some created things.
(c) Therefore, all objects of human knowledge are perceptions of created things.
Since our perceptions come into existence in the act or process of perceiving, our perceptions are also created.
In short, all human knowledge is created.
Furthermore, human knowledge is doubly created in that:
(a) The perceptions are created.
(b) What can be perceived are created things.
The Creation-creation Distinction extends to the object of knowledge.
15. The following Bible passage is paradigmatic in substantiating the claim that human beings cannot see God:
And the LORD said to Moses, "This very thing that you have spoken I will do, for you have found favor in my sight, and I know you by name." Moses said, "Please show me your glory." And he said, "I will make all my goodness pass before you and will proclaim before you my name 'The LORD.' And I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy. But," he said, "you cannot see my face, for man shall not see me and live." (Exodus 33:17-20 ESV)
16. Charles Hodge in his Systematic Theology gives a more philosophical explanation of why human beings cannot form a mental image of God:
It is not hold that God, properly speaking, can be conceived of; that is, we cannot form a mental image of God. "All conception," says Mr. Mansel, "implies imagination." To have a valid conception of a horse, he adds, we must be able "to combine" the attributes which form "the definition of the animal" into "a representative image." Conception is defined by Taylor in the same manner, as "the forming or bringing an image or idea into the mind by an effort of the will." In this sense of the word it must be admitted that the Infinite is not an object of knowledge. We cannot form an image of infinite space, or of infinite duration, or of an infinite whole. To form an image is to limit, to circumscribe. But the infinite is that which is incapable of limitation. It is admitted, therefore, that the infinite God is inconceivable. We can form no representative image of Him in our minds. ([1871-1873] 1981, 1:336)
17. Thus, since human beings cannot form an image of God in our minds, we cannot have visual perceptions of God.
Although visual perception is only one mode of human perception, the conclusion is generalized to all modes of human perception: human beings cannot have any perceptions of God whatsoever.
Hearing is also a mode of human perception.
What of all those records in the Bible about God speaking to man and man hearing God speaks to him?
To accommodate the thesis that human beings cannot have any perceptions of God, what human actually hears cannot be what God actually says.
Just as we cannot actually see God, so we cannot actually hear God.
When God speaks to man, some of which are verbal sentences which expresses propositions, what we actually hear cannot be what God actually said.
Thus, a proposition cannot mean the same thing to man as it does to God.
Assume a simple sentence with a subject and a predicate.
A sentence may express a proposition.
There are three ways the proposition expresses by the sentence does not mean the same thing to man as it does to God:
(a) The subject does not mean the same thing to man as it does to God.
(b) The predicate does not mean the same thing to man as it does to God.
(c) Both the subject and predicate do not mean the same thing to man as they do to God.
All three leads to skepticism, but the least damaging is option (b).
Hence analogical predication which in turn implies analogical knowledge.
18. According to this rational reconstruction:
(a) The culprit for analogical knowledge is the empirical intuition - the belief that all objects of knowledge are objects of perception.
(b) The empirical intuition implies all knowledge is created - perceptions come into existence in the act or process of perceiving.
(c) Since God's knowledge is not created and our knowledge is created, therefore, to be true knowledge, our knowledge must be analogical to God's knowledge.
19. I appraise the content of this rational reconstruction as fallacious.
We know truth and all truths are propositional.
Perceptions in itself are neither true nor false.
Therefore, perceptions cannot be objects of knowledge.
It is our interpretations of perceptions that are either true or false.
We interpret perceptions by making truth-claims about the perceptions.
The truth-claims are propositional.
And we can know true interpretations of perceptions.
Knowledge is knowledge of truth.
Since God knows all truths, if we do not know some of the truths God knows, then we do not know any truths.
References:
Bahnsen, Greg L. 1998. Van Til's Apologetics: Readings and Analysis. Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company.
Clark, Gordon H. et el. 1944. The Answer to a Complaint Against Several Actions and Decisions of the Presbytery of Philadelphia Taken in a Special Meeting Held on July 7, 1944.
Frame, John M. [1976] n.d. Van Til: The Theologian. Chattanooga, Tennessee: Pilgrim Publishing Company. (Originally published as The Problem of Theological Paradox. In Foundations of Christian Scholarship: Essays in the Van Til Perspective, ed. Gary North, 295-330. Vallecito, California: Ross House Books.)
Frame, John M. 1995. Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought. Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company.
Hodge, Charles. [1871-1873] 1981. Systematic Theology. Vol. 1. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
Horton, Michael. 2011. The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims On the Way. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan.
Van Til, Cornelius et el. 1944. The Text of a Complaint Against Actions of the Presbytery of Philadelphia In the Matter of the Licensure and Ordination of Dr. Gordon H. Clark.
End.
