Showing posts with label Theology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Theology. Show all posts

Thursday, August 22, 2013

Spykman on Dualism


Gordon J. Spykman


Front Cover of Reformational Theology (1992)


1. The main ploy for "Chapter 2: Prolegomena" of Gordon J. Spykman's Reformational Theology: A New Paradigm for Doing Dogmatics (1992) is dualism.

(Part 1: Foundations, Chapter 2: Prolegomena - An History Survey: Philosophy and Theology as Partners?; 13-39)

I find the analysis on dualism in this chapter very unsatisfying and like to explain why.


2. As with Spykman's Reformational Theology (1992), I enjoy the way some Dutch theologians organize their theologies around the creation-fall-redemption-glorification motif.

The motif is historical and provides an alternative to the traditional way of organizing the Biblical materials of systematic theologies around topics or loci.

In this Chapter 2, Gordon J. Spykman was out to oppose dualism and dualistic thought of various kinds.

I find his analysis very unsatisfying because in this chapter, Spykman ignored the foundational nature of Adam's fall and its consequences on reality.

I dare say that the vast majority of the "dualisms" Spykman enumerated in this chapter are consequences of the historic space-time fall of Adam's.

These dichotomies, antitheses, antinomies, dualities and dualisms are not illusions but are out there in the real world and are the results of the historic space-time fall.

The Fall has ontological consequences - God cursed women's childbearing with pain and the ground with thorns and thistles.


(Genesis 3:16-19 ESV):

To the woman he said,

“I will surely multiply your pain in childbearing;
in pain you shall bring forth children.
Your desire shall be for your husband,
and he shall rule over you.”

And to Adam he said,

“Because you have listened to the voice of your wife
and have eaten of the tree
of which I commanded you,
‘You shall not eat of it,’
cursed is the ground because of you;
in pain you shall eat of it all the days of your life;
thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you;
and you shall eat the plants of the field.
By the sweat of your face
you shall eat bread,
till you return to the ground,
for out of it you were taken;
for you are dust,
and to dust you shall return.”


3. Some definitions from Merriam-Webster:

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

Dichotomy -- a division into two especially mutually exclusive or contradictory groups or entities; also : the process or practice of making such a division.

Antithesis -- opposition, contrast.

Antinomy -- a contradiction between two apparently equally valid principles or between inferences correctly drawn from such principles.

Duality -- dualism; also : dichotomy.

Dualism -- a theory that considers reality to consist of two irreducible elements or modes.


4. Some dichotomies, antitheses, antinomies, dualities and dualisms enumerated by Spykman:

Faith and reason;

General revelation and special revelation;

Common grace and special grace;

Body and soul;

Nature and grace;

Christ and culture;

Divine and worldly;

Holy and profane;

Sacred and profane;

Sacred and secular;

Supernatural and natural;

Christian and secular;

Spiritual and secular;

City of God and City of the World;

Kingdom of God and Kingdom of the World;

Law and Gospel;

Inner and outer covenant;

Theocentric and anthropocentric thinking;

Facts and faith;

Dualism and monism;

Science and morality;

Fact and value;

Nature and freedom;

Reason and feeling;

Immanent and transcendent;

God and man;

Rational and experiential.


5. Reformed Christians in the Augustinian-Calvinian tradition believe in the sovereignty of God.

God is sovereign even over sin and evil.

God ordained and permitted the human race to fall into sin and thus humanity is divided into two classes: those that are in rebellion against God and those that are not.

Skypman considered Augustine's concept of City of God and City of the World to be dualistic.

I find Spykman totally unconvincing in attributing Augustine's City of God and City of the World to the influence of Greek thought (Spykman 1992, 19).

Augustine's division is grounded in the Bible -- the Fall of the human race and the redemption by Christ.

And in consequences of the Fall lies the origin of the vast majority of the dualistic tensions Spykman tries to overcome.

There is a descriptive as well as a normative aspect to these dualities - they are real but they are not normal.

These dualities are not "false" dualities in that are real and actual.

But these dualities are "false" in the sense that they are not normal; they are consequences of sin.


6. Take for example Spykman's criticism of Thomas Aquinas regarding the nature/grace dichotomy.

Spykman's criticism of Aquinas, following Francis Schaeffer, is basically right.
(See quotation of page 20 below.)

But Schaeffer shows more insight and puts the point better than Spykman.

(Schaeffer 1968, 11): "In Aquinas's view the will of man was fallen, but the intellect was not. From this incomplete view of the biblical Fall flowed all the subsequent difficulties. Man's intellect became autonomous. In one realm man was now independent, autonomous."

(By the way, in his Bibliography Spykman listed only one work of Francis Schaeffer: Death in the City (1969). But with his heavy dependence on Schaeffer's Escape from Reason (1968) in this chapter, Spykman should have listed that book too.)

Spykman thinks that "[t]hus the directional antithesis between judgment and redemption as taught in Scripture was turned once again into a structural antinomy between rival sectors of reality held together in bipolar tension" (Spykman 1992, 20).

But judgment and redemption presuppose sin and sin does divides reality into rival sectors -- Augustine's City of God and City of the World.


7. Gordon J. Spykman has more to say on dualism in later chapters of his Reformational Theology (1992).

But I find his analysis of dualism in Chapter 2 very unsatisfying.

Rather than blaming Greek thoughts and Roman Catholic Scholasticism, Spykman should begin his analysis of dualism with creation and the Fall of Adam.

The realities of many dualities or dualisms that Spykman enumerated are consequences of the historic space-time fall of Adam.

Sin divides created reality in various ways.

Many of the dichotomies, antitheses, antinomies, dualities and dualisms are but the symptoms and consequences of sin.

Man's problem has always been sin or the rebellion against God.

Any Biblical analysis of dualism or dualistic thoughts should recognize the foundational nature of sin and its consequences.


8. Appendix: Some quotations from Reformational Theology (1992)

(Spykman 1992, 15): "As I look back now, I see clearly that such dualist outlooks involve serious departures from the holistic worldview and life-vision which is given with creation and illumined by biblical revelation. Such dichotomies (meaning literally 'to cut in two') create false dilemmas for Christian scholarship. They betray a misconception of the nature of the antithesis - a confusing mixture of the structures of reality with the conflicting spiritual directions present in the world. They therefore trouble us needlessly with false antinomies so that, looking out on the world as it were with bifocal glasses, we always see things in bipolar tension (body and soul, realm of nature and realm of grace, daily bread and spiritual bread). We are in fact led to think that this is the way things really are. We then fail to realize that such bifocal glasses cause us to read into reality dualisms which actually are not there at all. Such misconceptions of the relationship between theology and philosophy are anchored in underlying dualist misconceptions of created reality itself. They result inevitably in the loss of biblical single-mindedness in Christian scholarship. For such dichotomies violate the integral unity which is woven into the rich variegated fabric of the creation order as well as the religiously whole sense of what being human means for our life in God's world."

(Spykman 1992, 16): "Critical reflection on our Christian past forces on us, almost incontrovertibly, the conclusion that nearly all our basic problems stem from false dilemmas occasioned by a wholly dubious "Christ/culture" (H. Richard Niebuhr) way of addressing the fundamental issues of a Christian worldview. Thus we get locked into the enduring problem of a dual normativity"

(Spykman 1992, 17): "To help keep our intent and purpose clearly in mind, here are the issues of primary concern: a) as already indicated, the relationship between philosophy and theology; b) paralleling that, the relationship of prolegomena to the rest of dogmatics; c) the recurring problem of casting these issues into the form of a nature/grace dualism; d) consequently, the dialectical tension which arises from such a dual (complementary and/or competing) normativity; and e) the effect of these patterns of thoughts on life in the Christian community."

(Spykman 1992, 19): "Increasingly, however, the victor became the victim. The philosopher-servant became the master architect who reconstructed the house of Christian theology. Major Christian thinkers freely adopted Greek forms of thought to shape the content of Christian faith. The dualist worldview so typical of Hellenist thought was embraced as the basic frame of reference for delineating the contours of Christian theology (note, for example, the antinomy in Augustine between the 'City of God' and the 'City of the World'). Such dualist-synthesis approaches reflect quite generally the theological models which emerged from the early era of Western Christianity. ..."

(Spykman 1992, 20): "Earlier Christian thinkers had relied most heavily on the 'vertical,' hierarchical structures of Platonic thought. But now, drawing on the more 'horizontal,' cause-and-effect categories of Aristotelian thought, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) bequeathed to Western Christianity a masterful synthesis. While updating the ancient problematic, he at the same time projected his restatement of it down through the medieval, Reformation, and modern eras, and on into our times. Instead of the biblical teaching that grace renews and restores nature, Thomas, in continuity with many mainline early church fathers, held that grace complements and elevates nature. Thus the directional antithesis between judgment and redemption as taught in Scripture was turned once again into a structural antinomy between rival sectors of reality held together in bipolar tension. The end product was a split-level of reality, with nature as a lower and grace as a higher order. Nature, despite sin, was viewed as still basically good; but grace was far better. Philosophy, accordingly, was viewed as belonging to the natural realm of reason, and theology as the supernatural realm of faith."


References:

Schaeffer, Francis A. 1968. Escape from Reason: A Penetrating Analysis of Trends in Modern Thought. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press.

Spykman, Gordon J. 1992. Reformational Theology: A New Paradigm for Doing Dogmatics. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

End.

Tuesday, August 06, 2013

Kingdom of God and Covenant






Gordon J. Spykman




Front Cover of Reformational Theology (1992)


1. The Reformed or Calvinistic theological tradition in North America is consisted of two main streams:

(a) Scottish Presbyterianism; and

(b) Dutch Calvinism.

There are other streams, of course.

One thinks of Reformed Anglicanism represented by James I. Packer and Alister McGrath, German Reformed represented by Philip Schaff, and many Reformed Baptists.


2. Reformational Theology: A New Paradigm for Doing Dogmatics (1992) by the late Gordon J. Spykman (1926 - 1993) stands squarely in the Dutch Calvinistic tradition.

In one of the publisher blurbs on the book's back cover, James I. Packer is quoted: "This rigorous neo-Kuyperian rethink of how theology should be done is a milestone in Reformed exposition. It is the most stimulating systematics that I have read for a long time."


3. The purpose of this blog post is to comment on how Spykman view Kingdom of God and Covenant in the following paragraph in Reformational Theology (1992); (Spykman 1992, 11-12):

"In all these valuable insights, reemphasized by much of recent biblical scholarship, we can discern a golden thread weaving its way through the total fabric of biblical revelation, lending it a coherent perspective on life. Perhaps for Reformed dogmatics it can be captured most succinctly in the pervasive biblical teaching on covenant and kingdom. Covenant and kingdom are like two sides of a single coin. Accordingly, we may say that in creation God covenanted his kingdom into existence. After the fall, God renewed the covenant with a view toward the coming of his kingdom. The ultimate goal is the restoration of all creation in the renewed earth. Thus, the original covenant stands forever as the abiding foundation and norm for life in God's world. Similarly, in the beginning God created his kingdom - "the heaven and the earth," the realm over which he rules. Mankind, then, as servants of the King, rebelled; but God came back, renewing the kingdom in a proleptic way through Israel, and then reestablished it decisively with the coming of King Jesus. The kingdom, therefore, now stands as a settled reality securely anchored in God's past act of salvation ("the kingdom is at hand"), as an abiding, present, coming reality (the redemptive "already" in Christ), and as an assured hope based on the promise of a future fully restored reality (the eschatological "not yet" on the way to its consummation). In this sense, covenant and kingdom are two ways of viewing the one all-embracing reality of God's way with his world. Covenant is kingdom looking back to its original and abiding charter given with the creation. Kingdom is covenant looking forward programmatically toward its promised goal of perfect renewal. Along the way this vision gives meaning and hope to our common call to covenant faithfulness and kingdom service."


4. My interest is in these two sentences of Spykman's: "Covenant and kingdom are like two sides of a single coin. Accordingly, we may say that in creation God covenanted his kingdom into existence."

Agreeing with Spykman that the Kingdom of God "is the realm over which he rules", then what is meant by "in creation God covenanted his kingdom into existence"?

Who did God covenanted with such that "God covenanted his kingdom into existence"?

And what is the covenant God made such that "God covenanted his kingdom into existence"?

My sense is that Spykman has the Covenant of Works in mind when he wrote: "God covenanted his kingdom into existence".


5. In covenant theology, there are three main covenants:

(a) Covenant of Redemption (or the Eternal Covenant) "refers to the covenant within the Trinity which established the plan of salvation, i.e. the agreement within the Godhead that the Father would appoint the Son to give up his life for mankind and that Jesus would do so (cf. Titus 1:1-3)." ("Covenant of Redemption", Theopedia.)

(b) Covenant of Works "is that pre-Fall agreement between God and Adam in which Adam was promised blessing and life upon obedience to the terms of the covenant and cursing and death should he disobey the terms of the covenant." ("Covenant of Works", Theopedia.)

(c) Covenant of Grace "promised eternal blessing for belief in Christ and obedience to God's word. It is seen as the basis for all biblical covenants that God made individually with Noah, Abraham, and David, nationally with O.T. Israel as a people, and universally with man in the New Covenant." ("Covenant of Grace", Theopedia.)


6. In creating, God was executing his eternal plan for creation.

The covenant involves in creation cannot be the Covenant of Works or the Covenant of Grace because neither Adam nor his progeny were in existence.

To make sense, the covenant refers to by "in creation God covenanted his kingdom into existence" can only be the eternal Covenant of Redemption.


7. Consider the following counterfactual scenarios:

(a) If God's eternal plan for creation does not consist of the creation of man but only of angels and that none of the angels fell into sin, then would there be a Kingdom of God?

Under this scenario, there will be no Covenant of Redemption.

If the Kingdom of God is the realm over which God rules, then under this scenario there will be a Kingdom of God.

(b) If God's eternal plan for creation does consist of the creation of man but does not consist of the fall of man, then would there be a Kingdom of God?

Under this scenario, there will be no Covenant of Redemption.

If the Kingdom of God is the realm over which God rules, then under this scenario there will be a Kingdom of God.

Under this scenario, man did not fell and they obey God.

(c) If God's eternal plan for creation does consist of the creation of man but the fall took place not with Adam but with one of his descendants and further there is a modified Covenant of Redemption that applies to these fallen descendants of Adam, then would there be a Kingdom of God?

Under this scenario, there will be a modified Covenant of Redemption.

If the Kingdom of God is the realm over which God rules, then under this scenario there will also be a Kingdom of God.

Under this scenario, only part of the human race fell and the part that did not fell belongs to the Kingdom of God.

(d) If God's eternal plan for creation consists of the creation of man and angel but man fell and none of the angels did, further there is no provision for the redemption of man, then would there be a Kingdom of God?

Under this scenario, there will be no Covenant of Redemption.

If the Kingdom of God is the realm over which God rules, then under this scenario there will be a Kingdom of God.

Under this scenario, the Kingdom of God consists of the unfallen angels.


8. Considering more scenarios along these lines suggest the following:

(a) If there is a covenant of redemption of some sort, then there will be a kingdom of God. (Some or all will be saved even if they fell into sin.)

(b) If there is no covenant of redemption, then there might or might not be a kingdom of God. (If some does not fell, then there will be a Kingdom of God. If all fell, there will be no Kingdom of God.)

(c) If there is a kingdom of God, then there might or might not be a covenant of redemption. 

(d) If there is no kingdom of God, then there could not be a covenant of redemption of some sort.


9. Two concepts are logically independent of each other if neither their affirmation nor denial can be deduced one from the other.

Covenant and Kingdom of God are logically independent of each other if:

(a) There is no covenant of redemption, or

(b) There is a kingdom of God.

Covenant and Kingdom of God are not logically independent of each other if:

(a) There is a covenant of redemption, or

(b) There is no kingdom of God.


10. If the above analysis is correct, then:

(a) The statement "[c]ovenant and kingdom are like two sides of a single coin" is false.

(b) The statement "[a]ccordingly, we may say that in creation God covenanted his kingdom into existence" is partially right.

The covenant in question will be some sort of Covenant of Redemption.

The existence of a Covenant of Redemption is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the existence of the Kingdom of God.

But saying "in creation God covenanted his kingdom into existence" is not a good way of stating the point because the covenant is prior to the creating.

My view is that:

Covenant is one way, and not the only way, God structured his kingdom.

(i.e. Covenant is a structural element of the Kingdom of God.)

In creating, God is executing his eternal plan (or Eternal Decrees).


References:

Spykman, Gordon J. 1992. Reformational Theology: A New Paradigm for Doing Dogmatics. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

"Covenant of Grace", Theopedia,
http://www.theopedia.com/Covenant_of_Grace
(accessed 2013-08-06).

"Covenant of Redemption", Theopedia,
http://www.theopedia.com/Covenant_of_Redemption
(accessed 2013-08-06).

"Covenant of Works", Theopedia,
http://www.theopedia.com/Covenant_of_Works
(accessed 2013-08-06).

End.

Sunday, August 14, 2011

Criticism, Falsifiability and Rationality





1. As a reader, one should be able to expect an author to have done his homework and get an attribution right.

I began reading Neil B. MacDonald's Metaphysics and the God of Israel being annoyed by his incorrect attribution.

In the Prologue of his book, MacDonald attributes the idea that falsifiability is a criterion of rationality to Karl Popper.

The attribution is false.

It is well known that Karl Popper proposes falsifiability as a criterion to demarcate between science and non-science.

Popper did not use falsifiability as a criterion for rationality.

Rather, the closest thing Popper used as a criterion for rationality is criticism.


2. MacDonald wrote (2006, xxii):

I mention two famous classical criteria of rationality. Descartes' criterion of certainty and Karl Popper's criterion of falsifiability:

(1) One ought not to believe something unless the belief is certain. This criterion says that it is irrational to believe something if the belief inquestion is not certain. We therefore require unassailable foundations. (Descartes)

(2) One ought not to believe something unless the belief is falsifiable. The criterion says that the belief is irrational if the belief is not falsifiable. It is irrational to believe something if the belief in question is not falsifiable. (Popper)


3. Popper ([1983] 1992, 27): "In fact, I have suggested that what distinguishes the attitude of rationality is simply openness to criticism."


4. Popper ([1992] 2005, 97): "There is no better synonym for 'rational' than 'critical'."


5. W. W. Bartley, III, Popper's student, wrote (1987, 212): "Rather, we locate rationality in criticism. A rationalist is, for us, one who holds all his positions - including standards, goals, decisions, criteria, authorities, and especially his own most fundamental framework or way of life - open to criticism. He withholds nothing from examination and review."


6. I do not believe MacDonald attribution to Descartes is correct either. 


References: 

Bartley, W.W. III. 1987. Theories of Rationality. In Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Gerard Radnitzky and W.W. Bartley, III, 205-214. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.

MacDonald, Neil B. 2006. Metaphysics and the God of Israel: Systematic Theology of the Old and New Testaments. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic.

Popper, Karl R. [1983] 1992. Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery. Ed. W.W. Bartley, III. London, England: Routledge.

Popper, Karl R. [1992] 2005. Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography. London, England: Routledge.

End.
 

Thursday, July 21, 2011

Knowability and Incomprehensibility of God - A Missed Opportunity




1. Michael Horton's The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims On the Way is a joy to read.

But a major weakness of Horton's is that he subscribes to Cornelius Van Til's theory of knowledge.

In following Van Til's theory of knowledge, Michael Horton has let pass an opportunity to clear-up some of the confusions in the doctrines of God, the Knowability of God and the Incomprehensibility of God.

The purpose of this post is to state and explain the confusions.

I will give examples in later posts.


2. There are two mutually exclusive views about the object of knowledge:

(a) The empirical intuition claims that all objects of knowledge are objects of perception.

(b) The propositional view claims that all objects of knowledge are truths or propositions, which are objects of conception.

These two views were part and parcel of the conflicts between Cornelius Van Til and Gordon H. Clark in the 1940s.

The conflict has become known as The Clark-Van Til Controversy.

Cornelius Van Til is ambiguous between these two views.

Following Van Til, Michael Horton is also ambiguous between these two views.

Gordon H. Clark believes in the propositional view of knowledge.

Following Clark, I also believe in the propositional view of knowledge.

In following Van Til, Michael Horton has let pass an opportunity to clear-up some confusions.


3. Following Gordon H. Clark, I believe:

(a) The object of knowledge is truth.

(b) All truths are propositional.

(c) Therefore, the object of knowledge is a proposition.

I believe we have perceptions.

I also believe perceptions are *sources* of knowledge.

But I do not believe perceptions are not the only sources of knowledge.

And I do not believe objects of perception are *objects* of knowledge.

All truths are propositional.

Some of our propositions might refer to or is about objects of perception, but the perception itself is not an object of knowledge.

We know truths and a perception in itself is neither true nor false, therefore an object of perception is not an object of knowledge.

But our interpretation of perceptions can be an object of knowledge.

We interpret a perception by making truth-claims about the perception.

A truth-claim is a proposition.

We have interpreted the perceptions truly or correctly if the truth-claims about the perceptions are true.

We have interpreted the perceptions falsely or incorrectly if the truth-claims about the perceptions are false.


4. Some confusions in the doctrines of God, the Knowability of God and the Incomprehensibility of God can be explained if it is assumed the confused take objects of perception as objects of knowledge.

If one takes objects of perception as objects of knowledge, then:

(a) God cannot be known directly through our perceptions of God because we cannot perceive God;

(b) The nature of God cannot be known through our perceptions of his nature because we cannot perceive the nature of God;

(c) The essence of God cannot be known through our perceptions of his essence because we cannot perceive the essence of God;

(d) God can only be known indirectly through his effects such as the effects of his actions; and

(e) God is knowable but incomprehensible becomes God is not understandable.


5. Visual perceptions are considered one of the most important modes of human perception.

The following Bible passage is paradigmatic in substantiating the claim that human beings cannot see God:

And the LORD said to Moses, "This very thing that you have spoken I will do, for you have found favor in my sight, and I know you by name." Moses said, "Please show me your glory." And he said, "I will make all my goodness pass before you and will proclaim before you my name 'The LORD.' And I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy. But," he said, "you cannot see my face, for man shall not see me and live." (Exodus 33:17-20 ESV)


6. Charles Hodge in his Systematic Theology gives a more philosophical explanation of why human beings cannot form a mental image of God:

It is not hold that God, properly speaking, can be conceived of; that is, we cannot form a mental image of God. "All conception," says Mr. Mansel, "implies imagination." To have a valid conception of a horse, he adds, we must be able "to combine" the attributes which form "the definition of the animal" into "a representative image." Conception is defined by Taylor in the same manner, as "the forming or bringing an image or idea into the mind by an effort of the will." In this sense of the word it must be admitted that the Infinite is not an object of knowledge. We cannot form an image of infinite space, or of infinite duration, or of an infinite whole. To form an image is to limit, to circumscribe. But the infinite is that which is incapable of limitation. It is admitted, therefore, that the infinite God is inconceivable. We can form no representative image of Him in our minds. ([1871-1873] 1981, 1:336)


7. Since human beings cannot form an image of God in our minds, we cannot have visual perceptions of God.

If we take objects of perception as objects of knowledge, then this implies that we cannot know God directly.

This is because we cannot form visual perceptions of God.

Although visual perception is only one mode of human perception, the conclusion is generalized to all modes of human perception: human beings cannot have any perceptions of God whatsoever.


8. Let's explain the terms "nature" and "essence".

The usual way to talk about the possession relation between an object and its properties is:

(a) An object exemplifies a property; or

(b) A property is exemplified in (or by) an object.

Other terms for "exemplify" are "instantiate" and "exhibit".

The nature of an essentialist claim is that an object necessarily or essentially possesses a property.

An object essentially possesses a property if:

(a) The object could not be the self-same object and could have lacked the property; or

(b) Under no possible circumstances could the object failed to possess the property.


9. Following Alvin Plantinga, I define the terms "nature" and "essence" thus:

(a) "The nature of an object can be thought of as a conjunctive property, including as conjuncts just those properties essential to that object." (1980, 7n1)

(a) An essence of an object is a property (or group of properties) that is essential and essentially unique to that object. (1974, 70)


10. Both nature and essence are properties.

A property is an abstract object that has neither spatial nor temporal location.

Abstract objects are objects of God's conceptual thoughts.

Since space-time comes into existence at the moment of God's creation and since God thinks before creating his creation, therefore God's thoughts have neither spatial nor temporal locations.

Therefore, as objects of God's conceptual thoughts, abstract objects too have neither spatial nor temporal locations.

Since abstract objects have neither spatial nor temporal locations, we cannot form perceptions of them through our perceptual faculty.

If all objects of knowledge are objects of perception and if we cannot perceive an abstract object, then we cannot know an abstract object.

Since a property is an abstract object, therefore we cannot know a property.

Since nature and essence are properties, therefore we cannot know nature and essence.

In particular, we cannot know either the nature of God or the essence of God.

The conclusion that we cannot know either the nature of God or the essence of God is based on the empirical intuition: the claim that all objects of knowledge are objects of perception.


11. The doctrine of the Knowability of God is the claim that it is possible to know God.

The doctrine of the Incomprehensibility of God is the claim that it is not possible to completely or exhaustively know God.

If we take objects of perception as objects of knowledge, then God cannot be comprehend in the sense that we cannot understand God.

If we cannot see God and form an image of God in our minds and if all objects of knowledge are objects of perception, then our minds is a blank with regards to God.

How can we understand what we cannot see and perceive and is a blank in our mind?

If one takes objects of perception as objects of knowledge and we cannot form an image of God in our minds, then:

(a) in the nature of the case, God is not understandable;

(b) in the nature of the case, God is incomprehensible; and

(c) in the nature of the case, God is not knowable.

Is it any wonder that those who accept the empirical intuition and reject the propositional view of knowledge have proclivities for mysticism and intuitive knowledge of God?


12. Charles Hodge is surely right when he writes in Systematic Theology:

The word, however, is often, and perhaps commonly, used in a less restricted sense. To conceive is to think. A conception is therefore a thought, and not necessarily an image. To say, therefore, that God is conceivable, in common language, is merely to say that He is thinkable. That is, that the thought (or idea) of God involves no contradiction or impossibility. We cannot think of a round squares, or that a part is equal to the whole. But we can think that God is infinite and eternal. ([1871-1873] 1981, 1:336-37)


13. The propositional view of knowledge interprets the doctrines of the Knowability and Incomprehensibility of God very differently from the empirical intuition.

If one takes truths or propositions, which are objects of conception, as objects of knowledge, then:

(a) God can be known directly through truth-claims about God;

(b) The nature of God can be (partially) known through truth-claims about his nature;

(c) The essence of God can be (partially) known through truth-claims about his essence;

(d) God can be known indirectly through truth-claims about his effects such as his actions; and

(e) God is knowable but incomprehensible means we can know some, but not all, truths about God.


References: 

Hodge, Charles. [1871-1873] 1981. Systematic Theology. Vol. 1. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Horton, Michael. 2011. The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims On the Way. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan.

Plantinga, Alvin. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Plantinga, Alvin. 1980. Does God have a Nature? Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press.

End.
 

Monday, July 18, 2011

A Rational Reconstruction of Analogical Knowledge




1. Michael Horton, following Cornelius Van Til, believes in the theory of analogical knowledge.

I, on the other hand, following Gordon H. Clark, believe the theory of analogical knowledge to be false.

But I am puzzled.

Why do Van Til, Horton and many other intelligent people believe that the theory of analogical knowledge is true?

The purpose of this blog post is to give an account of a possible reason why these intelligent people believe in a false theory.

The account is a rational reconstruction.

The claim is not that someone actually believes in analogical knowledge based on the rational reconstruction.

The claim is that the rational reconstruction gives a possible and plausible reason why someone would believe in analogical knowledge.


2. The general idea is that the Creator-creation Distinction implies analogical knowledge.

The Creator-creation Distinction is the ontological claim that everything there is can be divide into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive class: the uncreated and the created.

There is only one member in the uncreated class: God in Trinity.

Everything else belongs to the created class.

The Creator-creation Distinction implies that the existence of God is qualitatively different from the existence of his creation.

God the Creator is uncreated and exists eternally and necessarily.

The creation of God is created and exists temporally and contingently.

Analogical knowledge is knowledge of a proposition expresses by a sentence which contains at least one analogical predicate.

A predicate is an analogical predicate if it means something similar, but not the same, to man as it does to God.

Cornelius Van Til in The Text of a Complaint: "Man may possess true knowledge as he thinks God's thoughts after him. But because God is God, the creator, and man is man, the creature, the difference between the divine knowledge and the knowledge possible to man may never be conceived of merely in quantitative terms, as a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind. Otherwise the Creator-creature relationship is broken down at a most crucial point, and there is an assault upon the majesty of God." (1944, 3 column 1)


3. The term "knowledge" can refers to either what one knows or how one knows, or both together.

Thus, "knowledge" can refers to the object of knowledge or the act, process, mode or manner of knowing, or both together.

The Van Tillian theory of analogical knowledge is *not* a claim about how man knows.

The Van Tillian theory of analogical knowledge is not a claim about the act, process, mode or manner of man knowing.

Both Gordon H. Clark and Cornelius Van Til agree that how God knows and how man knows is qualitatively different.

They agree that the act, process, mode or manner of knowing is qualitatively different between God and man.

Gordon H. Clark: "The manner of God's knowing, an eternal intuition, is impossible for man." (1944, 9)

Cornelius Van Til: "Another possible objection to the foregoing exposition of Dr. Clark's views might take the form that he does draw a qualitative distinction between the knowledge of God and the knowledge possible for men since he freely recognizes a fundamental difference between the mode of God's knowledge and that of man's knowledge. God's knowledge is intuitive while man's is discursive (Cf. 18:5f., 18ff.). Man is dependent upon God for his knowledge. We gladly concede this point, and have reckoned with it in what has been said above." (1944, 6 column 2)


4. The Van Tillian theory of analogical knowledge is a claim about what one knows.

The Van Tillian theory of analogical knowledge is a claim about the object of knowledge:

(a) It claims that the object of human knowledge is qualitatively different from the object of God's knowledge.

(b) It denies that the object of human knowledge is a proper subset of the object of God's knowledge.

Cornelius Van Til in The Text of a Complaint: "If we are not to bring the divine knowledge of his thoughts and ways down to human knowledge, or our human knowledge up to his divine knowledge, we dare not maintain that his knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point. Our knowledge of any single proposition must always remain the knowledge of the creature. As true knowledge, that knowledge must be analogical to the knowledge which God possesses, but it can never be identified with the knowledge which the infinite and absolute Creator possesses of the same proposition." (1944, 5 column 3)

According to Van Til, "we dare not maintain that his knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point" (emphasis in original).


5. If Van Til's theory of analogical knowledge is a claim about what one knows, then what does one knows?

What is the object of knowledge?

Let's consider the candidates for object of knowledge.

There are two constraints that must be met by any candidate for object of knowledge:

(a) A person knows with his mind, so an object of knowledge must be mental.

(b) A person knows truth to be true and knows falsehood to be false, so an object of knowledge must be a bearer of truth and falsity.

Let's consider the first constraint:

Firstly, since things in the world (external to oneself) are not mental, if an object of knowledge must be mental, then things in the world cannot be an object of knowledge.

Secondly, if an object of knowledge must be mental, then there are three kinds of mental object that are possible candidates for being object of knowledge: objects of sensation, perception or conception.

Let's consider the second constraint:

Since a sensation in itself is neither true nor false, if an object of knowledge must be a bearer of truth and falsity, then a sensation cannot be an object of knowledge.

Since a perception in itself is also neither true nor false, if an object of knowledge must be a bearer of truth and falsity, then a perception also cannot be an object of knowledge.

The only known bearer of truth or falsity is a proposition and it is an object of conception.

Conclusion: The object of knowledge is truth; all truths are propositional; therefore the object of knowledge is a proposition.


6. If the proper object of knowledge is a proposition, then Van Til's theory of analogical knowledge is not proper.

In criticizing Gordon H. Clark in The Text of a Complaint, Van Til displays considerable skepticism towards proposition as the object of knowledge (1944, 5 column 2):

The fundamental assumption made by Dr. Clark is that truth, whether in the divine mind or in the human mind, is always propositional. Truth, it is said, cannot be conceived of except in terms of propositions (Cf. 2:9ff; 11:2, 14f.; and especially 22:19ff.). It will be observed that Dr. Clark does not claim to derive this judgment from Scripture; it is rather regarded as an axiom of reason (Cf. 36:13-17; 19:19ff.).

It is not necessary or appropriate to consider here all of the implications of this fundamental assumptions. A few observations are however, of immediate importance. This view of truth, it will be noted, conceives of truth as fundamentally quantitative, as consisting of a series of distinct items. Now even if it could be assumed that human knowledge has this propositional character, it would still involve a tremendous assumption to conclude that the divine knowledge must possess the same character. Since our thinking is pervasively conditioned by our creaturehood, we may not safely infer from the character of our knowledge what must be true of the knowledge of the Creator. Even if we could be sure that human knowledge might be resolved into distinct propositions, it would not necessarily follow that the knowledge of God, who penetrates into the depths of his own mind and of all things at a glance, would be subject to the same qualifications. And it may not be overlooked in this connection that Dr. Clark does not claim Scriptural proof for his fundamental assumption as to the character of knowledge.


7. What then does Cornelius Van Til regards as the object of knowledge?

I propose the following theses regarding the object of knowledge in a Van Tillian theory of analogical knowledge:

(a) Propositions are objects of human knowledge.

(b) Propositions are *not* the only objects of human knowledge.

(c) Objects of perceptions are also objects of human knowledge.

(d) Because of the Creator-creation Distinction, human is agnostic of the objects of God's knowledge.

(e) Because of the Creator-creation Distinction, human can infer that the object of human knowledge is analogical to the object of God's knowledge.

There is much to criticize in regarding these theses.

But I will refrain from criticisms for now.


8. Cornelius Van Til is a fertile thinker.

But Cornelius Van Til is an inconsistent thinker.

I will now briefly quote John Frame and Greg Bahnsen to show that they too have difficulty interpreting Van Til's theory of analogical knowledge.


9. John Frame gives contradictory explanations of Van Til's analogical knowledge.
Frame wrote in Van Til: The Theologian ([1976] n.d., 22): “‘Content’ is an exceedingly ambiguous term when applied to thought. The 'content' of my thought may mean (1) my mental images, (2) my beliefs, (3) the things I am thinking of, (4) the epistemological processes by which knowledge is acquired (including the role of sense-experience, intuition, reason, etc.), (5) the meaning of my language, conceived in abstraction from the linguistic forms used to state that meaning, (6) anything at all to which the physical metaphor 'contained in the mind' may conceivably apply. In senses (2) and (3), there seems to be no reason to assert any necessary 'difference in content' between divine and human thought. Surely God and man may have the same beliefs and may think about the same things (emphasis added)."

Whatever knowledge is, it is at least a true belief.

Also, the only bearer of truth or falsity is a proposition.

Since a belief may be true or false and since the only bearer of truth or falsity is a proposition, the object of belief is a proposition.

Since the object of belief is a proposition, if God and man may have the same beliefs, then God and man must be able to think the same propositions.

God is omniscient, which means God knows all truths.

God is essentially omniscient, which means God could not have been God and lack omniscient.

Since God exists eternally and essentially knows all truths, truths or propositions exist eternally and necessarily as the objects of God's knowledge.

As such, propositions are not created.

In having the same beliefs as God, human thinks propositions that are eternal and uncreated.

In Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, Frame gave a contradictory explanation: "Van Til sums up these emphases in the term analogy. Human knowledge is 'analogous' to God's, which means that it is (1) created and therefore different from God's own knowledge, and (2) subject to God's control and authority". (1995, 89)

Since knowledge is at least true belief, if human knowledge is different from God's own knowledge, then human belief must be different from God's belief.

This contradicts Frame's earlier claim that "God and man may have the same beliefs".

Human belief is either the same as God's belief or different from God's belief, but cannot be both.

Human knowledge is either the same as God’s own knowledge or different from God’s own knowledge, but cannot be both.

Human knowledge is either created or uncreated, but cannot be both.


10. Greg Bahnsen in Van Til's Apologetic: Reading and Analysis claims that a human can think the same things as God thinks: "In knowing anything, according to Van Til, man thinks what God Himself thinks: there is continuity between God's knowledge and man's knowledge, and thus a theoretical basis for the certainty of human knowledge. At the same time, of course, when man knows something, it is man doing the thinking and not God - which introduces a discontinuity between the two acts of knowing, a discontinuity that is greater and more profound than the discontinuity between one person's act of knowing something and another person's act of knowing it." (1998, 226)

Bahnsen does a bit of creative re-interpretation and shift the meaning of Van Til's analogical knowledge from the object of knowledge to the acts of knowing.

I heartily agree with Bahnsen that in knowing anything, man thinks what God himself thinks.

But Bahnsen must be confused.

For this is Gordon H. Clark's position, not Cornelius Van Til's!

For Van Til, human knowledge and divine knowledge do not "coincide at any single point".

For Van Til, human knowledge "can never be identified with the knowledge which the infinite and absolute Creator possesses of the same proposition".

I do not believe Bahnsen's interpretation is faithful to Van Til's writings.


11. Cornelius Van Til has never properly explained how the Creator-creation Distinction implies analogical knowledge.

Since I do not belief the Creation-creation Distinction implies analogical knowledge, I do not belief there can be any such explanation.

Knowledge is knowledge of truth.

Since God knows all truths, if we do not know some of the truths God knows, then we do not know any truths.

Although there cannot be a proper explanation of how the Creator-creation Distinction implies analogical knowledge, there nevertheless are two fallacious attempts at doing so:

(a) The conceptual approach at explanation is based on the idea that our propositions are finite replicas or copies of God's propositions.

(b) The perceptual approach at explanation is based on the idea that all objects of knowledge are objects of perceptions.

John Frame has attempted to flesh out the conceptual approach at explanation in (1995, 89-95).

Since this blog post is too long already, I will criticize Frame's attempted explanation of how the Creator-creation implies analogical knowledge in a future post.

I will now sketch the perceptual approach at explaining analogical knowledge.


12. The starting point for any rational reconstruction of Van Til’s theory of analogical knowledge is the Creator-creation Distinction.

The Creator-creation Distinction is the ontological claim that everything there is can be divide into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive class: the uncreated and the created.

The Creator-creation Distinction is based on the doctrines of God and creation.

Within Reformed theology, the Creator-creation Distinction is not problematic.


13. Cornelius Van Til then extends the Creator-creation Distinction from ontology to epistemology.

The question is why extend the Creator-creation Distinction from ontology to epistemology?

In itself, the Creator-creation Distinction is an ontological claim.

In itself, the Creator-creation Distinction does not imply analogical knowledge.

What additional considerations motivate Van Til to extend the Creator-creation Distinction from ontology to epistemology?


14. A plausible explanation is that Van Til believes in the empirical intuition and takes objects of perception as objects of knowledge.

The empirical intuition claims that all objects of knowledge are objects of perception.

As Michael Horton has written: "Epistemology follows ontology. In other words, our theory of how we know anything depends on what we think there is to be known." (2011, 47)

The Creator-creation Distinction divides everything ontologically into two classes: uncreated and created.

There is only one object belonging to the uncreated class of being: God in Trinity.

Everything else belongs to the class of created creation.

However, human beings cannot have perceptions of God.

But human beings can have perceptions of some created things.

Thus:

(a) All objects of human knowledge are objects of perception.

(b) Human beings cannot perceive God but can perceive some created things.

(c) Therefore, all objects of human knowledge are perceptions of created things.

Since our perceptions come into existence in the act or process of perceiving, our perceptions are also created.

In short, all human knowledge is created.

Furthermore, human knowledge is doubly created in that:

(a) The perceptions are created.

(b) What can be perceived are created things.

The Creation-creation Distinction extends to the object of knowledge.


15. The following Bible passage is paradigmatic in substantiating the claim that human beings cannot see God:

And the LORD said to Moses, "This very thing that you have spoken I will do, for you have found favor in my sight, and I know you by name." Moses said, "Please show me your glory." And he said, "I will make all my goodness pass before you and will proclaim before you my name 'The LORD.' And I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy. But," he said, "you cannot see my face, for man shall not see me and live." (Exodus 33:17-20 ESV)


16. Charles Hodge in his Systematic Theology gives a more philosophical explanation of why human beings cannot form a mental image of God:

It is not hold that God, properly speaking, can be conceived of; that is, we cannot form a mental image of God. "All conception," says Mr. Mansel, "implies imagination." To have a valid conception of a horse, he adds, we must be able "to combine" the attributes which form "the definition of the animal" into "a representative image." Conception is defined by Taylor in the same manner, as "the forming or bringing an image or idea into the mind by an effort of the will." In this sense of the word it must be admitted that the Infinite is not an object of knowledge. We cannot form an image of infinite space, or of infinite duration, or of an infinite whole. To form an image is to limit, to circumscribe. But the infinite is that which is incapable of limitation. It is admitted, therefore, that the infinite God is inconceivable. We can form no representative image of Him in our minds. ([1871-1873] 1981, 1:336)


17. Thus, since human beings cannot form an image of God in our minds, we cannot have visual perceptions of God.

Although visual perception is only one mode of human perception, the conclusion is generalized to all modes of human perception: human beings cannot have any perceptions of God whatsoever.

Hearing is also a mode of human perception.

What of all those records in the Bible about God speaking to man and man hearing God speaks to him?

To accommodate the thesis that human beings cannot have any perceptions of God, what human actually hears cannot be what God actually says.

Just as we cannot actually see God, so we cannot actually hear God.

When God speaks to man, some of which are verbal sentences which expresses propositions, what we actually hear cannot be what God actually said.

Thus, a proposition cannot mean the same thing to man as it does to God.

Assume a simple sentence with a subject and a predicate.

A sentence may express a proposition.

There are three ways the proposition expresses by the sentence does not mean the same thing to man as it does to God:

(a) The subject does not mean the same thing to man as it does to God.

(b) The predicate does not mean the same thing to man as it does to God.

(c) Both the subject and predicate do not mean the same thing to man as they do to God.

All three leads to skepticism, but the least damaging is option (b).

Hence analogical predication which in turn implies analogical knowledge.


18. According to this rational reconstruction:

(a) The culprit for analogical knowledge is the empirical intuition - the belief that all objects of knowledge are objects of perception.

(b) The empirical intuition implies all knowledge is created - perceptions come into existence in the act or process of perceiving.

(c) Since God's knowledge is not created and our knowledge is created, therefore, to be true knowledge, our knowledge must be analogical to God's knowledge.


19. I appraise the content of this rational reconstruction as fallacious.

We know truth and all truths are propositional.

Perceptions in itself are neither true nor false.

Therefore, perceptions cannot be objects of knowledge.

It is our interpretations of perceptions that are either true or false.

We interpret perceptions by making truth-claims about the perceptions.

The truth-claims are propositional.

And we can know true interpretations of perceptions.

Knowledge is knowledge of truth.

Since God knows all truths, if we do not know some of the truths God knows, then we do not know any truths.


References:

Bahnsen, Greg L. 1998. Van Til's Apologetics: Readings and Analysis. Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company.

Clark, Gordon H. et el. 1944. The Answer to a Complaint Against Several Actions and Decisions of the Presbytery of Philadelphia Taken in a Special Meeting Held on July 7, 1944.

Frame, John M. [1976] n.d. Van Til: The Theologian. Chattanooga, Tennessee: Pilgrim Publishing Company. (Originally published as The Problem of Theological Paradox. In Foundations of Christian Scholarship: Essays in the Van Til Perspective, ed. Gary North, 295-330. Vallecito, California: Ross House Books.)

Frame, John M. 1995. Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought. Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company.

Hodge, Charles. [1871-1873] 1981. Systematic Theology. Vol. 1. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Horton, Michael. 2011. The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims On the Way. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan.

Van Til, Cornelius et el. 1944. The Text of a Complaint Against Actions of the Presbytery of Philadelphia In the Matter of the Licensure and Ordination of Dr. Gordon H. Clark.

End.